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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¢ ciency of the Price Cap regulatory scheme and its impact
on universal access, when the monopolist is allowed to set a menu of alternative plans
as part of a self-selection strategy (second-degree price discrimination) and the cap is
calculated as the weighted average of the tari¤ plans he o¤ers.
In this context, we characterized the solution of the monopolist; who, besides o¤ering
a menu of plans more distorted than the second-best outcome even distorting the
plan for high-valuation consumersbecause the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and rents
extraction is exhibited in di¤erent way, can exclude consumers who are willing to pay for
the service shutdown policydespite of universal access obligation have been imposed
by the regulator. This happens regardless of the weighted average price cap (WAPC)
set by the regulator.
Consequently, if the Price Cap regulatory scheme is going to be used by the regula-
tor, this mechanism must be applied to a single regulated plan, leaving the monopolist
some exibility to o¤er alternative plans that will be incentive compatible with this
single regulated plan (tari¤ exibility).
Key Words: price cap; non-linear tari¤s; price discrimination; tari¤ exibility; uni-
versal access.
Classification JEL: L51; D52; L96
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1 Introduction
In several regulated industries like telecommunications, electricity and gas, regulators have
opted to use the Price Cap regulatory scheme1 at the expense of other schemes (e.g. rate of
return) because of the incentives that this mechanism generates, mainly in terms of encour-
aging productive e¢ ciency without discouraging investment2. However, industries regulated
by Price Caps also have other characteristics: most regulated rms are multi-product, price-
discriminating and, are also subjected to an universal access policy imposed by the regulator3.
The regulation by Price Caps of multi-product rms, since the regulator has limited
information about costs and/or demand for each one of the regulated services, is applied
to a "basket" of services rather than to each of them; i.e. the regulator regulates a price
index of the basket of services or a weighted average price. Note that the services of a basket
can belong to perfectly separated markets (the monopolist could price discriminate in third-
degree) or, to di¤erent market segments because the existence of di¤erent types of consumers
(he could price discriminate in second-degree)4. On the other hand, the universal access
policy is intrinsically linked to the tari¤ policy that the regulator implements. That is, an
inadequate pricing by the regulator or the rm, with for example high xed tari¤s, may lead
to non-participation of low-income consumers who had accessed the service if the tari¤s had
been properly set (i.e. they have willingness to pay for the service).
For purposes of this paper, we incorporate some of these characteristics (that have not
been included in previous studies) in the e¢ ciency analysis of the Price Cap regulatory
scheme. In particular, we will assume a monopolist that can price discriminate in second-
degree (this is the reason of dening a basket of services), but also faces an universal access
obligation.5
1Also known as RPI - X regulation.
2Models studying this topic are conducted under the typical problem of asymmetric information about
costs and/or demand between the regulator and the regulated rm (see Baron and Myerson, 1982). However,
in this paper we will assume that no such asymmetric information exists.
3According to Li Ning and Willington (2009), universal access has 2 dimensions: (i) one related to will-
ingness to pay of low-income consumers in services coverage areas, and (ii) the other is the lack of coverage
service in rural areas because of low demand and high costs.
In this paper, when referring to "universal access" we refer to (i). Inclusion of consumers related to (ii) will
depend on how feasible is the implementation of a subsidy (permanently or temporarily) by the Government.
Most countries have established funds, with contributions from the regulated rms themselves, to nance
projects for low-income consumers.
4In this issue, Bertoletti and Poletti (1997) show that third-degree price discrimination generates Pareto
improves when two-part tari¤s are regulated, in comparison with the prohibition of any tari¤ di¤erentiation.
On the other hand, Vogelsang (1990) and, Li Ning and Willington (2009) show the same, although when the
rm can price discriminate in second-degree.
5Without loss of generality, in this paper we refer to the telecommunications industry.
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It should be noted that, when a rm is allowed to price discriminate in second-degree,
the regulator sets the cap as the weighted average of all plans each one corresponding to
each consumer typeo¤ered by the monopolist, which will be adjusted over time according
to the productivity factor (X-factor) and variations in the index of input prices (RPI). The
monopolist has some exibility to o¤er a menu of plans that fulll with the following char-
acteristics: (i) allows di¤erent types of consumers self-select, and (ii) satises the cap set by
the regulator. This cap setting and its application is dened as the Weighted Average Price
Cap (WAPC) regulatory scheme.
In analyzing the e¢ ciency of the WAPC regulatory scheme, we do not focus on incentives
to productive e¢ ciency, but in the existence of incentives to achieve allocative-e¢ cient solu-
tions. According to the economic literature, achieving allocative e¢ ciency when a basket of
services is regulated by Price Capis possible under certain conditions. In relation to this
issue, Bradley and Price (1988) and Vogelsang (1988) demonstrate that, when there are no
changes in demand and costs, regulation by the WAPC leads to an iterative process that
converges to a Ramsey pricing structure6, whose speed of adjustment will depend not only
of the X-factor but also the weights used at the beginning of the regulatory process. On the
other hand, Vogelsang (1990)7 shows that if the regulated rm o¤ers two-part tari¤s as an
option, in addition to the initial tari¤ which should always o¤er (the constraint faced by the
regulated rm), Pareto optimal outcomes can be achieved; however to this happen, the initial
price vector (which always has to o¤er the regulated rm) must be properly regulated8. In
short, these authors consider that the initial tari¤ regulation is important for the regulator,
not only to induce productive e¢ ciency9 but also allocative e¢ ciency or Pareto solutions10.
Although all models mentioned above reach e¢ cient outcomes when the regulator grants
the regulated rm the possibility to set his own prices (also called price delegation), none
of them shows the ine¢ ciencies that could arise when the monopolist can price discriminate
in second-degree and, simultaneously, is regulated by the WAPC regulatory scheme (a menu
6Note that Ramsey prices can be exclusionary, which contradicts our assumption that the regulator is
interested in the universal access problem.
7Following the Incremental Surplus Scheme (ISS) due to Sappington and Sibley (1988), and the Sibleys
ISS-R scheme (1989).
8For the initial tari¤ setting, Vogelsang (1990) proposed the rate of return regulation. However, rm-
e¢ cient regulation can also be used.
9Bernstein et al. (2006) mentioned that if the initial regulated pricing makes prots equal to zero i.e. if
the regulator ensures that the initial regulation of prices are oriented at cost, with the application of the
RPI-X factor, the monopolist will continue make zero prots.
10Note that for the case of Vogelsang (1990), the regulator should set tari¤s for each type of consumer on
the market, which proved to be an impractical solution just by the information asymmetries that held the
regulator about the types of customers (only knows the distribution of them).
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of plans from which the regulator validates the fulllment of the WAPC)11. Therefore, in
this context and assuming that there is no information asymmetry between the regulator
and the regulated rm about costs and/or demand for the service, as shown below, the
WAPC regulatory scheme would encourage the monopolist to o¤er socially ine¢ cient plans,
even more distorted than the second-best solution (allocative ine¢ ciency). This happens
because the monopolist, considering the WAPC constraint on its problem, can not raise
the tari¤ of the high-valuation consumers plan. The latter encourages the monopolist to
extract informational rents from high-valuation consumers in another way: by reducing the
number of minutes included in the high-valuation consumers plan and shutting-down the low-
valuation consumers. It must be emphasized that these distortions occur despite the initial
setting of the weighted average price is cost oriented and the imposition of an universal access
obligation.
The peruvian experience
In Peru, since september 2001, the tari¤s for end users of xed telephone service are regulated
by Price Cap, specically by the Tari¤ Regime of Weighted Average Price Cap. In partic-
ular, the regulator (the Supervisory Agency for Private Investment in Telecommunications
- OSIPTEL) is the only responsible for calculating the WAPC, which is reduced according
to the RPI-X factor; while the regulated rm sets the di¤erentiated tari¤ plans so that end
users self-select and, simultaneously, fullls the WAPC set by the regulator.
The WAPC, according to the Concession Contract of Telefonica del Peru (TdP), is calcu-
lated for each basket of services o¤ered by TdP. Calls from xed-line subscribers are within
the so-called "Basket D", whose tari¤ components are: the xed monthly tari¤ (may include
free minutes or not) and the per-minute tari¤ (for additional minute)12. Thus, each tari¤
component is considered as a service provided by the TdP, which weighted by the share of
each services revenue of the previous period on the baskets revenue, we obtain the WAPC13.
It should be noted that each di¤erent tari¤ plan o¤ered by TdP are also part of the basket
11There are only papers that studies the welfare e¤ects of the thrid-degree price discrimination of a
monopoly regulated by price cap (see Armstrong and Vickers, 1991; and Bertoletti and Poletti, 1997).
12The Concession Contract of TdP establishes two additional baskets of xed-line services:
- Basket C: includes only the installation charge.
- Basket E: includes domestic and international long distance calls.
13In the TdPs contract, the WAPC is calculated from the following formula:
TTjn =
P
Tijn 1

ijn 1  Tijn
Tijn 1

subject to:
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D14.
As you can see, those di¤erentiated plans are three-part tari¤s: the consumer pays a xed
fee for the right to access the service plus a certain amount of minutes (free minutes), and
additionally pay a tari¤ for additional minute or excess beyond the free minutes. In this
regard, Bagh and Bhargava (2006) and Lambrecht et al. (2007) show that rms will have
incentives to o¤er plans with three-part tari¤s if there is uncertainty about the consumers
future demand, which ultimately leads to a decrease in consumer surplus and an increase
in rms revenue. However, in this paper we will assume that no exist such information
asymmetry and hence the monopolist only o¤ers two-part tari¤s or completely non-linear
tari¤s15.
Furthermore, the application of the Price Cap regulatory scheme as mentioned in the
Concession Contract of TdP, besides generates e¢ ciency problems, also encourages the reg-
ulated rm to behave in some opportunistic way in the application of the RPI-X factor. By
regulating a weighted average price the regulated rm has some freedom to "re-adjust" any
of the tari¤ components (or services) and thus fulll with the WAPC reductions resulting
from the application of the RPI-X factor. This means that, reductions in the WAPC does
not necessarily imply tari¤ reductions in all plans. For example, the regulated rm could
decide to fulll with the WAPC reductions, only reducing the per-minute tari¤ of some
high-consumption plans16 and, no reductions in the monthly xed tari¤ of high-consumption
plans and/or any of the tari¤s for low-consumption plans. This avoidance behavior by the
RTjn =
P
ijn 1  Tijn
Tijn 1

 Fn
where,
TTjn = Price Cap of basket jduring the quarter n.
RTjn = Ratio Ceiling of basket jduring the quarter n.
ijn 1 = Weighting factor of service "i" that belongs to basket "j" during the previous quarter, given the
share the services revenue "i" on the baskets revenue "j".
Tijn = Tari¤ of service ithat belongs to basket jduring the current quarter.
Tijn 1 = Tari¤ of service ithat belongs to basket jduring the previous quarter.
Fn = Control Factor for quarter n
Fn = (1 X) IPCn 1
IPCn 2
IPCn = Consumer Price Index of Metropolitan Lima for quarter n.
X = Quarterly Productivity Factor.
14For example, for a rm o¤ering 2 tari¤ plans, the weighted average price is calculated from 4 tari¤
components or services (2 xed monthly fees and 2 per-minute charges).
15A natural extension of this model is the incorporation of this information asymmetry.
16The weights of the per-minute tari¤ of high-consumption plans might be high enough to fulll the overall
reduction of the WAPC.
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regulated rm could increase the universal access problem.
Therefore, this paper attempt to demonstrate that in a context of WAPC regulation and
second-degree price discrimination, allocative ine¢ ciencies and some kind of monopolists
avoidance behavior arise. In the presence of these problems, it is recommended to design a
regulatory scheme involving the regulation by Price Cap of a single plan (e.g. the "Classic
Line" plan17), excepting that this regulated plan must always be o¤ered by the monopolist
as part of his menu of plans18. This will provide some exibility to the monopolist to o¤er
alternative plans but with the caveat that be incentive compatible with the regulated plan19,
thereby avoiding losses in consumer welfare.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the second part, the main assumptions
are made and two models are developed. The rst one characterizes the solution to be reached
if there were a social planner, who, not having asymmetric information about costs and/or
demand and only knows the distribution of consumers types, may set socially optimal prices
with zero prots for the monopolist. This model will be used as benchmark to compare
e¢ ciency gains. The second model presents the problem of the monopolist, who besides
being able to price discriminate in second-degree, has to face the WAPC constraint. The
inclusion of this restriction in the monopolists optimization problem generates plans more
distorted than the second-best outcome, even distorting the high-valuation consumers plan.
Finally, the third part presents some conclusions. The formal proofs are presented in the
appendix.
2 The Models
Since we are interested in analyzing the e¢ ciency level of the WAPC regulatory scheme,
as mentioned above, it is assumed that the regulator has complete information about the
monopolys operating costs and/or total demand, but imperfect with respect to the types of
consumers (both the regulator and the regulated rm only know the distribution of consumers
types). In this regard, we will use the Li Ning and Willington (2009) basic model.
17In the case of TdP, the regulated plan would involve the regulation of one monthly xed fee and one
additional per-minute tari¤, which also have to meet a minimum of quality requirements, among others.
18The restriction that the monopolist always has to o¤er the regulated plan jointly with other alternative
plans, is very similar to the restriction imposed by Vogelsang (1990), in the sense that the regulated rm
must always o¤er the initial tari¤.
19The regulation of a single plan and the exibility the monopolist has to o¤er alternative plans is dened
as "tari¤ exibility". See Li Ning and Willington (2009).
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Consumers
It is assumed that there are two types of consumers: one of high valuation (h) and another
of low valuation (l). The utility of being connected is ui and consuming m minutes is vi(m),
for i = h; l. The proportion of high-valuation consumers is  and low-valuation is , where
+  = 1.
For simplicity, we assume that both types of consumers have no uncertainty about their
future demand and, thus pay a total transfer Ti, for i = h; l, that include the right to access
the network and an amount of minutes20. Accordingly, the net utility of consumingmminutes
is ui + vi(mi)  Ti(mi), for i = h; l:
Additionally, it is assumed that vi is di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave. Also,
it is assumed that v0h (m) > v
0
l (m) ; 8m > 0 and lim
mi!1
v0i (mi) = 0, for i = h; l.
The Firm
The rms revenues come from the consumerspayments (Th, Tl). The cost function is:
C(m) = A+ g(m)
where A is the network sunk xed cost and g(m) is the variable cost that depends on the
amount of minutes produced. It is assumed that g0(m) > 0 and g00(m) = 0.
In this context, the e¢ cient or rst-best quantities are dened as: mh  fmh : v0h (mh) =
g0g and ml  fml : v0l (ml) = g0g; while the second-best quantities when the monopolist can
price discriminate in second-degree is: mSBl  fml : v0l(ml) = g0(:) +  [v0h(ml)  g0(:)]g.
The Regulator
The regulators objective is to maximize the consumerssurplus. To do it, he is responsible
to: (i) determining the weighted average price cap (TR  Th+(1  )Tl) that the regulated
rm must fulll when o¤ers alternative plans, where  2 (0; 1) is the weighting of the high-
20With the non-existence of such uncertainty, a plan with a three-part tari¤ (or an additional per-minute
tari¤) does not hold (see Lambrecht, Seim and skier, 2007). In terms of the plans currently o¤ered by TdP,
it would imply that each plan would have a single tari¤ component.
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valuation consumers plan21 ;22; and (ii) calculating and applying the RPI-X factor which
reduce the cap over time. Recall that in this paper we only analyze the (allocative) e¢ ciency
of using a WAPC scheme to regulate the monopolists market power.
Since it is assumed that the regulator has complete information about the costs and/or
demand, he can determine the socially optimal tari¤s for the di¤erent types of consumers; i.e.
the regulator can set a menu
 
TRl ;m
R
l

;
 
TRh ;m
R
h
	
such that consumers self-select (only
knows the distribution of consumer types) and the monopoly does not make losses. From
the socially optimal menu, the regulator could determine the socially optimal WAPC:
TR = TRh + (1  )TRl (PC)
such that the regulated rm always makes zero prots in each application of the RPI-X
factor23.
Moreover, because the regulator promotes a universal access policy, with the regulated
menu
 
TRl ;m
R
l

;
 
TRh ;m
R
h
	
ensures the low-valuation consumer participation; i.e. we as-
sume that holds:
ul + vl(ml)  Tl  Ul (UA)
where Ul is the reservation utility of such consumer24.
Timing
1. Regulator sets the weighted average price cap (TR).
2. Monopolist o¤ers alternative plans: f(Th; mh); (Tl; ml)g such that fullls with the
weighted average price cap (TR) set by the regulator.
21It is noteworthy that in regulated industries,  is dened as the share of the revenue that represents the
high-valuation consumers plan on the monopolists total revenue. However, for its calculation the regulator
uses information from immediately preceding periods. This is why  is considered as a parameter in this
paper.
22 2 (0; 1) means we are assuming that, in previous periods, there were low-valuation consumers willing
to pay for the service. According to Rodríguez (2004), in periods prior to the privatization of TdP (and
therefore before the application of the RPI-X factor), 22.3% of consumers who had no xed-telephone at
home in 2003, once had access to it; being the main cause of service cancellation the inability to pay a higher
xed monthly tari¤.
23This is consistent with the economic literature regarding the initial tari¤ setting, before the rst appli-
cation of the RPI-X factor, must be regulated to costs (monopolist break-even) to ensure that the Price Cap
regulation be allocative and productively e¢ cient.
24For the plan
 
TRl ;m
R
l

;
 
TRh ;m
R
h
	
ensures the low-valuation consumer participation, we assume that
the xed costs Aare not as high and the regulator nds socially protable o¤er a plan to such consumer.
Otherwise, the solution would be trivial.
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3. Consumers choose a plan and consume.
2.1 Central Planners Model: The socially optimal solution
As mentioned above, on the assumption of complete information about the monopolys
costs and/or demand for the service, the regulator can set a menu of socially optimal plans 
TRl ;m
R
l

;
 
TRh ;m
R
h
	
such that consumers self-select and the monopolist makes zero prof-
its. This menu of regulated plans will serve as a benchmark, in terms of allocative e¢ ciency
achieved, when we will discuss the WAPC regulatory scheme.
The regulators problem is:
Max
fTRh ;TRl ;mRh ;mRl g
[uh + vh(m
R
h )  TRh ] + [ul + vl(mRl )  TRl ] (PR)
subject to:
TRh + T
R
l   A  g(mRh + mRl )  0 (R1)
uh + vh(m
R
h )  TRh  Uh (R2)
ul + vl(m
R
l )  TRl  Ul (R3)
ul + vl(m
R
l )  TRl  ul + vl(mRh )  TRh (R4)
uh + vh(m
R
h )  TRh  uh + vh(mRl )  TRl (R5)
TRh ; T
R
l ;m
R
h ;m
R
l  0
Note that (R2) is not binding and is always satised (by assumption). The solution to
the regulators problem is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 : If the regulator is interested in universal access, (R3) is active and the
solution to (PR) is: mSBl < m
R
l < m

l and m
R
h = m

h. The payments (T
R
l ; T
R
h ) are such that
(R1) and (R5) are binding.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that, if the regulator had the same information handled by the monop-
olist and set the menu of alternative plans instead the monopolist, he would set less distorted
plans than those plans that the monopolist would set. In the typical screening problem, the
monopolist faces the typical trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and informational rents extraction,
having incentives to distort the plan for low-valuation consumers with the purpose of ex-
tracting the informational rents from the high-valuation consumers. The monopolist obtains
9
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Figure 1: Socially optimal regulation
extranormal prots in detriment of the surplus of high-valuation consumers (recall that low-
valuation consumer always participates and reaches his reservation utility, Ul). Therefore,
if the regulator had the ability to set the monopolists menu of plans (because he knows
the costs and/or demand), then he would set plans that could avoid any informational rents
extraction (which are passed on to consumers) and the corresponding loses in e¢ ciency. The
gains in social welfare when the regulator sets the menu of plans (instead of the monopolist)
are derived from Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 : The monopolists prots in the second-best solution are greater than zero.
Proof. See appendix.
By concavity of the monopolists prot function, there is a unique plan to the right of
mSBl such that the monopolist self-nance ( = 0), the low-valuation consumer keeps his
reservation utility, Ul, and the high-valuation consumer reaches a lower indi¤erence curve
(higher utility level)25, providing unambiguous gains in social welfare with the regulated
plan. Figure 1 shows the results mentioned above, where ZH + ZL = A.
Consequently, considering the results above, the regulator has the task of establishing a
regulatory scheme that not only encourages the monopolist to be productively e¢ cient, but
25The redistribution of rents to consumers could also benet low-valuation consumers, reaching a lower
indi¤erence curve (higher utility level). However, for simplicity it has been assumed that the low-valuation
consumer will always be on his reservation utility, Ul.
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also to o¤er alternative plans that generates, at least, a similar level of allocative e¢ ciency
than the obtained in proposition 1. However, as will be shown in the next section, this will
be impossible to achieve if the regulator uses the WAPC regulatory scheme.
2.2 Weighted Average Price Cap Model
The WAPC regulatory scheme is characterized because the regulator, rather than establish a
menu of regulated plans, delegates the pricing to the monopolist (he has better information
for it). However, the regulator is responsible for setting the cap as a weighted average price
(TR ), which will be reduced according to the RPI-X factor (also calculated by the regulator).
Additionally, the regulator maintains a universal access policy.
The monopolist will price discriminate in second-degree in order to maximize his prots.
This imply the design of a menu of alternative plans f(Tl;ml) ; (Th;mh)g such that encourages
consumers to reveal their type and, simultaneously, fulll with the weighted average price
cap set by the regulator; i.e. carry out Th + (1  )Tl  TR.
The monopolists problem is dened as:
Max
fTh;Tl;mh;mlg
Th + Tl   A  g(mh + ml) (PM)
subject to:
uh + vh(mh)  Th  Uh (R2)
ul + vl(ml)  Tl  Ul (R3)
ul + vl(ml)  Tl  ul + vl(mh)  Th (R4)
uh + vh(mh)  Th  uh + vh(ml)  Tl (R5)
Th + (1  )Tl  TR (R6)
TRh ; T
R
l ;m
R
h ;m
R
l  0
Note that (R2) is not binding and is always satised (by assumption).
It is noteworthy that, if the WAPC constraint (R6) is not included, the monopolists
problem above is reduced to the simple screening problem, in which the monopolist does
not know the types of consumers and o¤ers a menu of plans such that consumers self-select.
Obviously, the solution to this screening problem is the second best, which was introduced
in the assumptions of the monopolist.
The solution to the monopolists problem is summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 : Under the WAPC regulatory scheme, if the regulator imposes an universal
access policy and the monopolists xed costs (A) are not as high, then (R3), (R5) and (R6)
are actives and the solution of (PM) is: ml2 < mSBl and mh2 < m

h. The payments (Tl2; Th2)
are such that (R3) and (R6) are binding.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 tell us that, under the WAPC regulatory scheme, the monopolist still has
incentives to extract informational rents from high-valuation consumers, inducing ine¢ cient
allocation results. By delegating the setting of the menu of plans to the monopolist, in the
classical screening model he will maximize his prots by setting plans equal to the second-best
outcome f(T SBl ;mSBl ); (T SBh ;mh)g; i.e. he will face the typical trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency
(distorting ml and Tl) and rent extraction (increasing Th but with the same mh).
Now, when the WAPC constraint is imposed, the monopolist may continue extracting
informational rents, although not by increasing Th over the second best T SBh but by re-
ducing mh; i.e. the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and rent extraction is presented in di¤erent
way: the distortion of the low-valuation consumers plan (on his reservation utility Ul) is
accompanied by a distortion of mh from the rst best mh. If this distortion does not occur,
then the monopolist fullls with the WAPC constraint but would not be maximizing prots;
or otherwise.
The Figure 2 shows the mechanism behind the menu of plans designed by the monopolist,
as well the ine¢ cient results generated by the application of the WAPC regulatory scheme.
If the WAPC constraint does not exist, the monopolist has the exibility to set a menu of
plans and will maximize his prots distorting the high-valuation consumers plan with the
intention of extracting informational rents from the high-valuation consumers; i.e. he will
set the menu f(T SBl ;mSBl ); (T SBh ;mh)g. However, o¤ering a second-best menu implies that
the WAPC constraint will not be fullled T SBh + (1  )T SBl > TR(see the stars for both
types of consumers in Figure 2).
In this situation, the monopolist has two alternatives: (i) reduce T SBh (distorting m

h) so
that, together with T SBl , the WAPC constraint is fullled
26; or, (ii) reduce T SBl (distorting
mSBl ) so that, together with T
SB
h , the WAPC constraint is fullled
27. Choosing the rst
alternative the monopolists prots would be a¤ected in [v0h(mh) g0(:)]; while with the sec-
26In the Figure 2, this involves moving from the second best stars for both types of consumersto a menu
of star for low-valuation consumerand cross for high-valuation consumer, f(mSBl ; TSBl ); (mh; Th)g.
27That is, moving from the second best to a menu of circles for both types of consumers,
f(ml; Tl); (mh; TSBh )g.
12
m
R
lm2lm
*
lm 2hm
R
hh mm =
*
0,hU
3,hU
0,lU
mg '
T
RT
hT
+D
lT
-D
SB
lm
Figure 2: Distortions in the WAPC model
ond alternative would be a¤ected in [v0l(ml)  g0(:)] g0(:)28. Since the monopolists prot
function is concave in m (see Corollary 2), [v0l(ml)   g0(:)] > v0h(mh) and the monopolist
will choose the alternative (ii). In words, the monopolist will distort the low-valuation con-
sumers plan beyond the second best (ml < mSBl ) with the intention to continue extracting
informational rents from high-valuation consumers by o¤ering a plan with the same payment
(T SBh ) but a lower amount of minutes (mh < m

h). In terms of Figure 2, the incorporation of
the WAPC constraint leads to the monopolist o¤ering a menu of plans equal to the circles
for both types of consumers.
Thus, under the WAPC regulatory scheme, the monopolist o¤ers a menu of alternative
plans more distorted than the second-best outcome and the socially optimal (allocative in-
e¢ ciency), generating losses in social welfare. The low-valuation consumer remains on his
reservation utility Uland the high-valuation consumer reaches a higher indi¤erence curve
(lower utility level) than the one reached in the second best; besides both types of consumers
are consuming ine¢ cient quantities.
Furthermore, it should be noted that this result still remains ine¢ cient despite the
weighted average price cap (TR) is calculated from the solution of the central planner of
28Note that by reducing the amount of minutes consumed m, g0(:) is the reduction in costs for producing
one minute less and v0(m) is the reduction in revenue to stop selling one minute.
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section 2.129. Note that the distortions in m do not explicitly depend on TR; that is, re-
gardless of the value of TR, the monopolist will distort the menu of plans with the intention
to continue extracting informational rents, which ultimately leads to the ine¢ cient results
shown in Proposition 3.
Despite the ndings, the monopolist can still continue extracting rents under certain
situations. Obviously, the monopolists prots depend on the proportion of each type of
consumer, being strictly increasing in . This means that the monopolist can implement
a shutdown policy of low-valuation consumers if there is a su¢ ciently large to extract
all informational rents from high-valuation consumers, such as classical theory of contracts
refers to (see La¤ont and Martimort, 2002).
According to La¤ont and Martimort (2002), the monopolist will implement a shutdown
policy of low-valuation consumers if:
[vh(m
SB
l )  vl(mSBl )]  (1  )[T SBl   g0mSBl ] (SP)
that is, if the expected costs of leave informational rents to high-valuation consumers (for
the low-valuation consumer participation) are at least as large as the expected benets from
transacting with the low-valuation consumer at the second-best outcome. From this, we
dene SB as:
SB  f : [vh(mSBl )  vl(mSBl )] = (1  )[T SBl   g0mSBl ]g (D1)
In this regard, to implement a shutdown policy under the WAPC regulatory scheme,
the monopolist will not take in consideration the extra benets generated by the shutdown
policy at the second-best solution (i.e. from SB which induces the shutdown policy at the
second best), but those that will generate the shutdown policy from the solution presented in
Proposition 3. The latter implies that, under the WAPC regulatory scheme, there also exist
a PC su¢ ciently large but lower to SBthat generates the shutdown of low-valuation
consumer. Thus, considering that the monopolist would implement a optimal shutdown
policy30, PC is dened as:
PC  f : [vh(ml2)  vl(ml2)] = (1  )[Tl2   g0ml2]g (D2)
29TR set from TRh and T
R
l , which makes zero prots. Recall that Bernstein et al. (2006) and Vogelsang
(1990), highlight the importance of the initial pricing before the application of the RPI-X mechanism.
30A shutdown policy of low-valuation consumer is optimal if (SP) holds.
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Now we present the solution to the monopolists problem when he implements a shutdown
policy of low-valuation consumer.
Proposition 4 : For any   PC, the imposition of an universal access obligation in
a WAPC regulatory scheme is not restrictive, and the monopolist will only o¤er a plan to
high-valuation consumers, such that: mh3 < mh and Th3 =
1

TR.31
Proof. See appendix.
The exibility the monopolist has to set a menu of plans for both types of consumers
(main characteristic of WAPC regulatory scheme), also implies that he has enough exibility
to decide not o¤er a plan for low-valuation consumer if it is not protable, as long as fullls
with the WAPC constraint. That is, the shutdown of low-valuation consumer may occur
regardless if the universal access obligation is imposed or not32.
In terms of Proposition 4, although the regulator imposes an universal access obligation
to the monopolist, the latter may nd some situation when   PCin which it is not
protable to o¤er a plan to low-valuation consumers. In such situations, the monopolist will
prefer to shutdown low-valuation consumers to focus only in the extraction of all informational
rents from the high-valuation consumers by o¤ering a plan on his reservation utility Uh.
However, as shown in Proposition 3, the informational rents extraction are presented in a
di¤erent way. According to the classical literature of contract theory, with the shutdown of
the low-valuation consumer, the monopolist should be able to o¤er an e¢ cient plan to high-
valuation consumers (Th;mh). In contrast, this does not happen under the WAPC regulatory
scheme because, the increase in Th is limited by the presence of the WAPC constraint, which
ultimately encourages the monopolist to extract rents by distorting mh from the rst best
mh. This distortion will be such that the high-valuation consumer reaches its reservation
utility Uh.
Figure 3 shows the results mentioned above. In it we can see how the solution to the
monopolists problem, presented in Proposition 3, changes to an  increases33. Then we
can say that there is an  associated to a second-best solution (black stars for both types
of consumers) from which the monopolist still might not have incentives to implement a
shutdown policy of low-valuation consumers i.e. [vh(mSBl )   vl(mSBl )] < (1   )[T SBl  
31We uses the subscript h3 to di¤erentiate the solution of monopolists problem in Proposition 4 and the
solution presented in Proposition 3.
32The universal service obligation fulllment is not veriable by the regulator, because he does not possess
complete information about the existence of low-valuation consumers who are willing to pay for the service
and not access it by the lack of supply plans for these type of consumers.
33For each  there is an unique second-best solution, which is distorted to fulll with the WAPC constraint.
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Figure 3: Distortions due to shutdown of low-valuation consumers
g0mSBl ], but with the distortions presented in Proposition 3 may nd it unprotable to o¤er
a plan for the low-valuation consumer i.e. [vh(ml2)   vl(ml2)] > (1   )[Tl2   g0ml2].
Thus, for any   PC , the monopolist decides to shutdown low-valuation consumer to
focus in the informational rents extraction from high-valuation consumers by increasing Th,
such that the WAPC constraint is fullled (the cross for high valuation consumer); however,
the monopolist still has margin to continue extracting rents (note that cross is not on the
reservation utility Uh;0), which are obtained by reducing mh (the monopolist o¤ers the black
square and extracts all surplus from the high-valuation consumer).
It is worth mentioning that, as consequence from the monopolists decision of doesnt o¤er
a plan to low-valuation consumer, the monopolist would be restricting access to consumers
who could access to the market but they dont do it just by lack of plans. In general, for any
  PC , the low-valuation consumers are shutdown from the market, although the reasons
for this may be di¤erent34. However, if for SB the monopolist is able to cover his total costs
and [vh(mSBl )   vl(mSBl )] < (1   )[T SBl   g0mSBl ], then for any  2 (PC ; SB) there is
clear that low-valuation consumers were shutdown from the market when they did have the
34Obviously, one cause for shutdown a certain types of consumers is the preference of the monopolist to
extract informational rents instead of provide the service to these types of consumers. Another cause is the
high xed costs (mainly sunk) that restrict the access to certain types of consumers.
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willingness to pay for the service and enter to the market; that is, if the universal access
obligation would not been imposed, the monopolist would set a second-best menu of plans
and both types of consumers would be participating in the market.
Therefore, despite the regulator imposes an universal access obligation, the use of the
WAPC regulatory scheme allows that: (i) the monopolist can implement a shutdown policy
of low-valuation consumers ceasing to o¤er the service to consumers willing to pay for such
service, (ii) distortions on the menu of plans are maintained and, (iii) once implemented the
shutdown policy, there is nothing to prevent the extraction of all surplus from high-valuation
consumers.
The e¤ect of using the WAPC regulatory scheme on the monopolists menu of plans is
summarized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 5 Under WAPC regulatory scheme, if (1   )v0l(ml) < g0(:) then dmhdml > 0, 8ml
and  > SB:
Proof. See appendix.
That is, while the regulator decides to use the WAPC regulatory scheme, the monopolist,
even with the incorporation of such constraint on his problem, will still have exibility to
set the menu of plans and will prefer to distort it with the intention to continue extracting
informational rents.
A prot-maximizing monopolist, by distorting ml will also distort mh to cover losses
caused by the fulllment of the WAPC constraint. The prots will depend on the prots size
obtained due to changes in ml and mh, which could be even greater than those achieved in
the second-best solution.
3 Conclusions
We analyze the Price Cap regulatory scheme from the point of view of allocative e¢ ciency
and universal access, in particular when the RPI-X mechanism is applied to a weighted
average price, which is calculated from the menu of plans o¤ered by the monopolist as part
of a second-degree price discriminating strategy.
In this context, the regulation by Weighted Average Price Cap (WAPC), which imply
services or goods grouped into baskets, generates additional incentives for the monopolist
to extract informational rents from high-valuation consumers, distorting the plans of both
types of consumers beyond the second-best outcome (ml < mSBl and mh < m

h) and leading
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to social welfare losses. This happen despite that the initial prices were set to costs (tari¤s
that make zero prots), contradicting what until now the economic literature has proposed
about it.
It has also been demonstrated that the WAPC constraint does not meet the primary
objective of limiting the monopolists market power. On the one hand, the monopolist can
implement a shutdown policy of low-valuation consumers (for   PC , despite that the
regulator impose a universal access obligation), whose main consequence is the non-provision
of service to consumers who are willing to pay for the service. On the other hand, this
regulatory scheme does not prevent the monopolist extracts all high-valuation consumers
surplus, if the shutdown policy is implemented. The use of this regulatory scheme seems to
be the cause of what happened in the Peruvian telecommunications market, since there were
consumers that had been in the xed-telephone market before the WAPC was implemented,
and subsequently left it.
In that sense, the policy recommendation is that when the regulator allows the monopolist
to price discriminates in second-degree, the latter should not be regulated by Price Cap,
calculated as the weighted average of the plans o¤ered. However, if the regulator wants to
keep using the Price Cap scheme, the RPI-X factor should be applied to a single plan (e.g.
the plan "Classic Line"), leaving some exibility to the monopolist to o¤er alternative plans
(see Li Ning and Willington, 2009).
It is noteworthy that the regulation of a single plan (tari¤exibility) will allow to transfer
the gains in productivity, through the RPI-X factor application, to all consumers. This
happen because the monopolist must o¤er alternative plans which are incentive compatible
with the unique regulated plan. It also avoids any elusive behavior by the monopolist in the
RPI-X application, beneting all types of consumers.
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A Appendix
Proof. [Proposition 1] The Lagrangian of the regulators problem, when he is interested
in the universal access problem (R3 active), is as follows:
L = [uh + vh(m
R
h )  TRh ] + [ul + vl(mRl )  TRl ] + [TRh + TRl   A  g(mRh + mRl )]
[ul + vl(m
R
l )  TRl   Ul] + '[vh(mRh )  TRh   vh(mRl ) + TRl ]
The rst order conditions:
TRh :  +   ' = 0 =) ' = (  1) ;  > 1
TRl :   +    + ' = 0 =)  =   1
mRh : v
0
h(m
R
h )  g0(:) + 'v0h(mRh ) = 0
v0h(m
R
h ) = g
0(:)
mRl : v
0
l(m
R
l )  g0(:) + v0l(mRl )  'v0h(mRl ) = 0
v0l(m
R
l ) =
(1  )
   g
0(:) +
(  1)
   v
0
h(m
R
l )
v0l(m
R
l ) = g
0(:) + 

  1
  

v0h(m
R
l )  g0

By concavity of v(m) and since v0h(m
R
h ) = g
0(:), we conclude that v0l(m
SB
l ) > v
0
l(m
R
l ). There-
fore, the plan for low-valuation consumer set by the regulator is less distorted than the
second-best solution; that is, the low-valuation consumer will consume a greater amount of
minutes than the second-best quantity (approaching to the e¢ cient outcome).
Moreover, from the low-valuation consumers incentive compatible constraint (R5) as an
equality:
uh + vh(m
R
h )  TRh = uh + vh(mRl )  TRl
TRh = T
R
l + vh(m
R
h )  vh(mRl )
Substituting above in the monopolists participation constraint (R1) as an equality, the pay-
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ments are:
TRl = A+ g(:)  vh(mRh ) + vh(mRl )
TRh = A+ g(:) + (1  )vh(mRh )  (1  )vh(mRl )
Proof. [Corollary 2] This demonstration is taken from Li Ning and Willington (2009).
Since the regulator sets plans such that the monopolist makes zero prots, it is enough to
show that the monopolists prot function is monotonically decreasing in ml as the socially
optimal plan moves along the low-valuation indi¤erence curve Ul (i.e. TRl = ul+vl(m
R
l ) Ul).
The monopolists prot function can therefore be rewritten as:
 =  [ul + vl (ml)  Ul + vh(mh)  vh(ml)  g0mh] +  [ul + vl (ml)  Ul   g0ml]  A
Di¤erentiating with respect to ml:
@
@ml
: v0l (ml)  v0h(ml) + v0l (ml)  g0
Note that from the latter equation, we get the second-best solution (the ml that maximizes
the prot function). Taking into account the Proposition 1 (i.e. evaluating at ml = mRl ), we
have:
v0l
 
mRl
  v0h(mRl )  g0
v0l
 
mRl
    
  1

v0l(m
R
l ) +


  1

g0   g0
 v0l(mRl ) + g0 < 0
By Proposition 1, it was shown that for mRl the prots are zero and m
R
l > m
SB
l . The above
shows that for quantities greater than mSBl , the prot function is decreasing on ml and,
therefore, the monopolists prots are greater than zero at mSBl .
Proof. [Proposition 3] The Lagrangian of the monopolists problem is:
L = Th + Tl   A  g(mh + ml) + [ul + vl(ml)  Tl   Ul]
+[vh(mh)  Th   vh(ml) + Tl] + 2[TR   Th   (1  )Tl]
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The rst order conditions are:
Th :      2 = 0 =)  =   2 > 0
Tl :  +      2(1  ) = 0 =)  = 1  2 > 0 ; 2 < 1 ; 2 > 0
mh :  g0(:) + v0h(mh) = 0
v0h(mh2) =

  2
g0(:) ;  > 2
ml :  g0(:) + v0l(ml)  v0h(ml) = 0
v0l(ml) =
1  
1  2
g0(:) +
  2
1  2
v0h(ml)
v0l(ml2) = g
0(:) + 

  2
 (1  2)
v0h(ml) 
  2
 (1  2)
g0(:)

; 2 < 1 ;  > 2
The payments are:
Tl = ul + vl(ml)  Ul
Th =
1

TR   1  

[ul + vl(ml)  Ul]
Therefore, since  > 2 then v
0
h(mh2) > v
0
h(m

h) and v
0
l(ml2) > v
0
l(m
SB
l ).
Proof. [Proposition 4] By Corollary 2 is shown that the prot function is strictly de-
creasing on ml when the constraint (R3) is binding (i.e. the low-valuation consumer gets his
reservation utility Ul;0). Consequently, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, we conclude that
for each , there is a unique solution (T SBl ;m
SB
l ), and hence (Tl2;ml2) when applying the
WAPC regulatory scheme. The latter is true because the prot function is strictly increasing
on  (see Li Ning and Willington, 2009).
Therefore, for any   PC , the monopolist will not o¤ers a plan for low valuation
consumer (the universal access is not guaranteed), and the monopolists problem is dened
as follows:
Max
fTh;mhg
Th   A  g(mh) (PM)
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subject to:
uh + vh(mh)  Th  Uh (R2)
Th  TR (R6)
TRh ;m
R
h  0
The Lagrangian is as follows:
L = Th   A  g(mh) + [uh + vh(mh)  Th   Uh] + 3[TR   Th]
The rst order conditions are:
Th : 1    3 = 0 =)  = 1  3 > 0
mh :  g0(:) + v0h(mh) = 0
v0h(mh3) =
1
1  3
g0(:)
Considering that 1   3 > 0, we have that v0h(mh3) > v0h(mh) and thus mh3 < mh: The
payment Th is:
TR = Th + (1  )Tl
Th3 =
1

TR
Proof. [Corollary 5] From Proposition 3 we have that the monopolist will distorts both
mSBl (reducing T
SB
l ) and m

h (holding T
SB
h ) to fulll with the WAPC constraint. In this
context, the distortions in plans of low and high-valuation consumers, respectively, will impact
on the monopolists prots in the following way:
 = Th + vl(ml)  A  g(mh + ml)
@
@ml
= [v0l(ml)  g0(:)] (C1)
@
@mh
=  g0(:) (C2)
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From condition (C1) and concavity of vl(m), increases inml cut down the monopolists prots
in [v0l(ml)   g0(:)]; while from condition (C2), increases in mh raise his prots in g0(:).
Thus, for any distortion of mSBl as consequence of the fulllment the WAPC constraint, the
monopolist will always distorts mh from the rst-best outcome; typical reaction of a prot-
maximizing monopolist, who in this case is minimizing losses caused by the fulllment the
WAPC constraint. This applies for any g0(:) > 0.
Therefore, if the gains of distorting mh o¤set the losses of distorting ml i.e. (1  
)v0l(ml) < g
0(:), the monopolist will make greater prots than those achieved in the second-
best outcome.
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